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 What things are there? Well, there are some things of which I am perceptually aware 
– a chewed up pencil, a computer screen, the sound of metal scraping against metal from 
a construction site across the street. But maybe that’s just the start of it. Maybe there are 
further things, things that are distant in various ways from these things. For example: 
 --  Things of which I am perceptually unaware, like the cup on the shelf behind me,  
  the quarter in my wallet, and Bob Stalnaker. 
 --  Far-away things, like Seyfert’s Sextet, the Crab Nebula and the Large Magellanic  
  Cloud. 
 --  Past and future things, like Joan of Arc, the strike with which Big Ben marked the 
  beginning of the 21st century, the strike with which Big Ben will mark the   
  beginning of the 22nd century, and the 70th American president. 
 --  Things that never have existed or will exist in our world, like the children Joan of  
  Arc might have had if she had not seen visions. 
 For each of these very different ways of being distant, there are interesting 
philosophical questions to be asked about the ontological status of things that are distant 
in this way. 
 First question: Are there such things? Call people who answer no to this question 
eliminativists about distance. 
 Second question: If there are such things, are they in some interesting way different 
from proximate things? This question needs some work. Of course distant things are 
different from proximate things: they are distant! Of course this difference is interesting: 
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that’s why we are asking questions about it! One way to get clearer about what is being 
asked is to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Think of a property as a 
way for a thing to be. A property is extrinsic when being that way involves standing in 
some relation to some other things, or failing to stand in some relation to some other 
things, intrinsic otherwise. Now we can ask: is there an intrinsic property shared by all 
and only proximate things, and another intrinsic property shared by all and only distant 
things? Still this question needs more work. Of course there are such properties! Take the 
things of which I am perceptually aware. Each of these things is intrinsically unique 
(nothing else has precisely the mass and shape of this chewed up pencil). So the property 
of being intrinsically just like the chewed up pencil, or intrinsically just like the computer 
screen, or intrinsically just like the sound of metal scraping against metal… is shared by 
all and only the things of which I am perceptually aware. But this is not the sort of 
property we are interested in. Better: is there an intrinsic property such that to be 
proximate is to have this property, an intrinsic property such that to be distant is to have 
this property? Call people who answer yes to this question realists about distance, people 
who answer no to this question anti-realists about distance.1 




                                                 
1 A terminological point: With respect to past and future things, eliminativists are commonly known as 
‘presentists’, anti-eliminativists as ‘eternalists’. And, following McTaggart (1908), eliminativists and 
realists are commonly known as species of ‘A-theorists’, anti-realists as ‘B-theorists.’ So realism about the 
past and future, the view I will be calling ‘tense realism’, is sometimes known as ‘eternalist A-theory’. 
With all due respect to McTaggart’s great paper, his choice of terminology was poor – characterless, 
unmemorable. I will not use I here.  
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     Are there distantk things? 
 
 
    Yes     No 
           Eliminativism about distanceK 
 Is there an intrinsic property such that  
 to be distantK is to have this property? 
 
 
  Yes    No 
Realism about distanceK Anti-realism about distanceK 
 
 
 Here’s a demographic observation. Some forms of eliminativism and realism about 
distance have received more attention than others. There are vast literatures on 
eliminativism and realism about possibilia, and on eliminativism and realism about past 
and/or future things. Many philosophers defend these views and many more take them 
seriously. But much, much less has been written on eliminativism and realism about 
things of which I am not perceptually aware. Almost no philosophers defend these views, 
and few take them seriously. 
 Why is this? Well, that is a big question. For present purposes, let’s narrow it down 
to a manageable size. Why is it that so much has been written on realism about the past 
and future (henceforth tense realism), but so little about realism about things of which I 
am not perceptually aware (henceforth perspectival realism)? 
 In this article I will survey what I take to be the best arguments for and against tense 
realism and perspectival realism. But my stance will not be entirely impartial. I think that 
perspectival realism is in many ways a better view than tense realism. I think it a pity that  
tense realism has received so much more attention. My aim is to explain why. In the first 
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section I will suggest that the major considerations that support tense realism also support 
perspectival realism. In the second I will suggest that the major problems that afflict tense 
realism do not afflict perspectival realism. In the third I will suggest that perspectival 
realism is a less absurd view than it may appear. 
 
1. Why Be a Tense Realist? 
 Tense realists say that past, present and future entities (where I mean ‘entities’ to be 
understood very broadly – to include people, material objects, moments, events etc.) 
exist. They say that some of these entities precede or succeed others. And they say an 
entity’s being past, present or future consists in its having a distinctive intrinsic property. 
 What moves them to accept this view? It is not that they think that our best scientific 
theories posit important intrinsic differences between past, present and future entities. 
Textbooks on foundational physics don’t mention such differences. It is rather that they 
think that realism about tense is uniquely capable of making sense of the phenomenology 
of temporal experience.2 It represents the world as we perceive it to be, in a way that anti-
realism does not.  
                                                 
2 I should note that I am focusing on this consideration because I take it to be the best reason to be a tense 
realist. As a matter of fact, tense realism has a long history, and tense realists have been moved by many 
different considerations. Some of these considerations now seem obsolete. For example, some philosophers 
have worried that tense anti-realists (eternalists who deny that there are intrinsic tensed properties) cannot 
account for the content of our tense-involving beliefs and utterances. This worry was famously voiced by 
A.N. Prior in 1951, in response to Quine’s anti-realist semantics for tensed utterances. Prior had a way with 
words:  
‘One says, e.g. “Thank goodness that’s over!”, and not only is this, when said, quite clear 
without any date appended, but it says something which it is impossible that any use of a 
tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn’t mean the same as, e.g. 
“Thank goodness the date of the conclusion of that thing is Friday June 15, 1954”, even if 
it be said then. (Nor, for that matter, does it mean “Thank goodness the conclusion of that 
thing is contemporaneous with this utterance”. Why should anyone thank goodness for 
that?)’ 
But in subsequent years a number of philosophers, prominently Lewis (see Lewis 1979), Perry (see Perry 
1979) and Stalnaker (see, most recently, Stalnaker 2008), have developed, to their own satisfaction, a 
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 There are really two thoughts here. The first appeals to the non-relational character 
of temporal experience. I am watching the Olympic 10,000 meters. Tirunesh Dibaba 
finishes far ahead of her American rival. Call the event of Dibaba finishing D, and the 
event of her rival finishing R. Realists and their opponents agree that D happens before 
R, D happens at 3:29:54.66 pm on 15 August 2008, R happens at 3:30:22.22 pm on 15 
August 2008. But this is not what I see. I do not see D happening before R, I do not see D 
happening in relation to one moment, R happening in relation to another moment. I see D 
happening, and later I see R happening. Generally, we do not only see, hear and feel 
events happening before other events, events happening at times, objects coming into 
being before other objects, objects being at times. We also see, hear and feel events 
happening, objects being. By saying that entities have tensed properties, and that their 
having them is not matter their standing in some relation to other entities, the realist about 
tense takes herself to be representing the world as we see, hear and feel it to be. 
 The second thought appeals to the experienced passage of time. This is notoriously 
difficult to articulate in a precise way. The rough idea is that the anti-realist picture fails 
to represent time passing in the way that we feel it does. To represent time passing in the 
way that we feel it does we need to add intrinsic tensed properties to the anti-realist 
picture, and then stipulate that the distribution of these properties changes. According to a 
famous metaphor: the present is like a spotlight, illuminating a three-dimensional slice of 
                                                 
variety of anti-realist theories of the content of tense-involving beliefs and utterances. (These are known as 
different theories of ‘de se content’, because they treat tense-involving beliefs and utterances in broadly the 
same way they treat self-involving beliefs and utterances). If a philosopher wants to say that none of these 
theories work, the burden is now very much upon her to explain why.  
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a four-dimensional extended reality, and moving along this four-dimensionally extended 
reality at a remorseless pace.3 
 All aspects of this second thought are controversial. Some philosophers doubt that 
the moving spotlight picture makes any sense (what does it mean to say that the spotlight 
moves?). Some others doubt that there is a distinctive experience of a ‘passage of time’ 
that tense realism is uniquely capable of accommodating.  
 Let’s leave the second thought for now, and concentrate on the first: tense realism is 
uniquely capable of vindicating the non-relational character of temporal experience. If 
this thought moves me to accept tense realism, then a similar kind of thought may move 
me to accept perspectival realism. You and I are watching the medal ceremony for the 
10,000 meters, me in front of the podium, you behind it. Dibaba is to the left of her 
American rival relative to my point of view. Dibaba is to the right of her American rival 
relative to your point of view. But neither of us sees this. I do not see Dibaba to the left of 
her American rival relative to some point of view. I see Dibaba to the left of her 
American rival. You do not see Dibaba to the right of her American rival relative to some 
point of view. You see Dibaba to the right of her American rival. Now you leave the 
ceremony, while I stick around. Dibaba is absent in relation to you, present in relation to 
me. But this is not how either of us experiences it. It is not that, for you, Dibaba is absent 
in relation to some person. For you, Dibaba is absent. It is not that, for me, Dibaba is 
present in relation to some person. For me, Dibaba is present.  
 So, if I am concerned to adopt a metaphysical picture that represents the world as I 
experience it to be, then in the first case I should take it that the Dibaba / American rival 
                                                 
3 The metaphor (in its original form a ‘policeman’s bullseye’) is due to C. D. Broad. See Broad (1923) p. 
59. 
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pair has an intrinsic property: having its faster half to the left. In the second case I should 
take it that Dibaba has an intrinsic property: being present. This latter property is shared 
by all and only the things of which I am perceptually aware. 
 I conclude, then, that a major consideration that supports realism about tense also 
supports perspectival realism. 
 
2. Why Not Be a Tense Realist? 
 There are many worries that you might have about tense realism. I will focus on two 
important kinds of worry. 
 First, there are worries from meta-ontology. Maybe the debate between realists and 
anti-realists about tense is merely verbal – maybe it is one of those debates where the 
source of the disagreement is just one party choosing to use words one way, another party 
choosing to use words another way. Or maybe it is based on a conceptual confusion – 
maybe it is one of those debates where both parties mistakenly assume that there is a 
distinction to be made between their respective positions because they are confused about 
concepts.  
 If you wish to get a quick feel for this worry, I recommend that you try to explain 
tense realism to a layperson. This is how the conversation is likely to go: 
 
Philosopher:  Tense realists are eternalists who believe in intrinsic tensed properties. 
 
Layperson:  What is an eternalist? 
 
Philosopher:  Eternalists believe that past, present and future things exist. So, for  
   example, eternalists believe that Joan of Arc exists. 
 
Layperson:  They believe that she is up there in heaven? 
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Philosopher:  No. They don’t believe that she exists-now. They believe that she exists. 
 
Layperson:  You mean they believe that she existed. 
 
Philosopher:  No. They believe that she exists. 
 
Layperson (after much thrashing around): It sounds like they are using words in a funny  
   way. So when they say ‘exists-now’ they mean what I mean when I say  
   ‘exists’. When they say ‘exists’ they mean what I mean when I say ‘exists  
   or existed or will exist.’ 
 
Philosopher:  No. Eternalists and their opponents, presentists, agree that you are right to  
   say that Joan of Arc exists or existed or will exist, but they disagree over a 
   further  question: ‘Does she exist?’ 
 
Layperson: I have absolutely no idea what you are talking about. 
 
Philosopher: Okay… Well, maybe we will have more luck with the second component  
   of the view. Tense realists believe that things have intrinsic tensed   
   properties. So, for example, Joan of Arc’s trial has the intrinsic property  
   being past. 
 
Layperson: Joan of Arc’s trial had the intrinsic property being past? 
 
Philosopher: No. It has the intrinsic property being past. 
 
Layperson:  Again, I have absolutely no idea what you are talking about. 
 
 The lesson to be learned from these conversations is that to distinguish realism about 
tense from other views in its vicinity we need to make use of a notion of tenseless 
existence, according to which it is not an analytic truth that all things that exist, exist-
now, and we need to make use of a notion of tenseless property-instantiation, a notion 
that allows us to talk of past and future things having properties, and to distinguish the 
properties they have from the properties they had. These are not notions that laypeople 
readily comprehend. 
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 This does not show that there is no substantive, interesting question about whether 
realism about tense is right. Many interesting, substantive questions (in math, for 
example) take years of training and great conceptual sophistication to understand. But it 
does raise worries. Some philosophers believe these worries are well-founded, others do 
not. I will not summarize their debate over the meta-ontology of time here, but I will 
point out that there are no analogous worries about the realism about the self. 
Perspectival realists believe that things of which they are not perceptually aware exist – 
in the ordinary sense of ‘exist’. They believe that things of which they are perceptually 
aware have distinctive intrinsic properties that other things lack – in the ordinary sense of 
‘have’. Maybe they are right, maybe they are wrong, but they do not need to make use of 
any suspicious notions to state their view. 
 The second sort of worry about tense realism concerns the role of simultaneity in the 
view. I watch Dibaba finishing the race. There’s a distinctive intrinsic property that the 
event of her finishing, call it event D, has, and it is in virtue of having that property that 
the event occurs now. What other events have the property? Does a supernova in the 
galaxy M81, call it event S, have the property? That depends, it would seem, on whether 
S occurs at the same time as D. But the theory of special relativity teaches us that all 
simultaneity is simultaneity-relative-to-an-inertial-frame-of-reference. It may be that 
relative to one frame FBefore, S occurs before D, relative to another frame FSimultaneous, S 
occurs at the same time as D, and relative to yet another rest-frame FAfter, S occurs after D. 
What, then, can a realist about tense say about whether S occurs now?  
 Well, she has two basic options. Either she accepts that special relativity tells us 
everything we need to know about simultaneity, or she denies it. If she accepts it then  
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there are a couple of ways for her to go. She can say that there is no one distinctive 
intrinsic property being-now, rather a family of extrinsic properties being-now-in-
relation-to-FBefore, being now-in-relation-to-FSimultaneous etc. S has the property being now-
in-relation-to-FSimultaneous, but does not have the property being-now-in-relation-to-FBefore. 
Or she can say that there is a distinctive intrinsic property being-now, but the having of 
properties is a relational matter. S has-in-relation-to-FSimultaneous the property being-now. S 
does not have-in-relational-to-FBefore the property being-now. 
 Whichever way she goes, the tense realist must back away from the simple claim 
that events occur now in virtue of instantiating an intrinsic property. And furthermore she 
must expose herself to a solipsistic worry. She is taking it that, for any frame F, the 
measure of whether an event E has the property being-now-in-relation-to-F (or, thinking 
about it the second way, the measure of whether an event E has-in-relation-to-F the 
property being-now) is whether E occurs simultaneously with D, relative to F. But there 
is no frame relative to which D is not simultaneous with D. So, for any frame F, D has the 
property being-now-in-relation-to-F (thinking about it the second way, D has-in-relation-
to-F the property of being now). This is not true of S. So there is a deep asymmetry in the 
universe between events that occur close to me, like D, and events that occur far from 
me, like S. The former events are now-relative to all frames (are, relative to all rest 
frames, now – thinking the second way), the latter are not. This is not the kind of 
asymmetry that tense realism was designed to generate. 
 The tense realist’s other option is to deny that special relativity tells us everything 
there is to know about simultaneity. In addition to facts about frame-relative simultaneity, 
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given by special relativity, there are facts about absolute simultaneity. Event D, and all 
events absolutely simultaneous with it, have the intrinsic property being-now.  
 Of course it may be (tense realists don’t have to say this, but it is a natural thing to 
say) that there is a connection between absolute simultaneity and the frame-relative 
simultaneity described by special relativity. It may be that there is a frame, call it the 
Super Frame, such that two events are absolutely simultaneous if and only if they are 
simultaneous relative to it. But special relativity doesn’t tell us which frame is the Super 
Frame. Indeed, it doesn’t tell us that one frame is the Super Frame. These are extra facts. 
 Is it awkward for the tense realist to posit such extra facts? Perhaps not. After all, 
tense realists were always committed to extra facts of a kind. Tense realists don’t think 
that it is the business of a theory of physics to tell us whether an event has the intrinsic 
property being now, or even that some events have the intrinsic property being now. But 
you might worry that the tense realists’ motivating idea about the phenomenology of 
temporal experience does not support such ontological profligacy. We started with the 
idea that certain events (e.g. Dibaba’s finishing the 10,000 meters, the passage of your 
eyes across this section of text…) were special, unlike other events, and we have 
somehow ended up with the idea that a certain inertial frame of reference is special, 
unlike other inertial frames of reference. That’s a big jump. 
 Again, I will not say that these worries are deadly for tense realism. But I will point 
out that there are no analogous worries for perspectival realism. Perspectival realism does 




3. What Perspectival Realists Can Learn From Tense Realists 
 Let’s review where we are. In the first section of this paper I suggested that a 
significant consideration that supports tense realism also supports perspectival realism. In 
the second I suggested that two significant problems that afflict tense realism do not 
afflict perspectival realism.  
 If you wish to pursue the problems further, I can recommend some reading.4 In any 
case, I hope that I have said enough so far to make one question salient: Why has tense 
realism received so much attention and perspectival realism so little? 
 Part of the answer may have to do with what perspectival realism entails. My 
adopting the view commits me to a kind of solipsism – not the kind of solipsism 
according to which only I exist, but a kind of solipsism according to which I am 
surrounded by a sphere of intrinsic privilege. There is a distinctive intrinsic property had 
by all and only the things of which I am aware. It is in virtue of their having this property 
that they are things of which I am aware. I will not win many friends by adopting this 
view. Outside of philosophy departments the word ‘solipsism’ serves interchangeably as 
the name of a doctrine, the name of a vice, and the name of a psychological ailment. 
                                                 
4 On meta-ontology: Ted Sider gives a robust defense of the idea that there is an interesting question about 
which of tense-eliminativism, tense-realism and tense-anti-realism is right in Sider (1999) and Sider (2006). 
To get a sense of why it may be difficult to distinguish the views, I recommend Zimmerman (2005). The 
debate here is embedded in a more general debate about the status of questions about what exists. This 
more general debate first came into focus in exchanges between Quine (see especially Quine (1948) and 
(1951)), and Carnap (see especially Carnap (1936), (1956) and (1969)). Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman 
eds. (2009) provides a wide-ranging overview of its current state. On special relativity: Arthur Prior (1996) 
and Dean Zimmerman (2007) argue for reconciling tense realism and tense eliminativism with special 
relativity by supplementing special relativity with facts about absolute simultaneity. Brad Skow 
(forthcoming) suggests a way to reconcile tense realism with special relativity without doing so.   
 
 13 
  But if we cared about winning friends we would not have become philosophers. Are 
there good philosophical reasons to avoid adopting perspectival realism? What’s so bad 
about the view?  
 First pass: Perspectival realism is absurd. The goal of philosophical writing is 
persuasion. Philosophical writers try to persuade us to believe what they believe. Here’s a 
book about perspectival realism by Penny the Perspectival Realist. Penny believes that 
there is a sphere of intrinsic distinction surrounding herself, Penny. Does she really 
expect me to believe the same? Am I to put her book down, go off to my class and 
announce: “Penny the Perspectival Realist has convinced me that she is special, that there 
is a sphere of intrinsic distinction surrounding her, that all and only the entities of which 
she is aware bear the intrinsic property being-entities-of-which-I-am-aware”? Surely not. 
And if this writer doesn’t expect me to believe all that she believes, then why should I 
take her seriously? 
 But this worry, if it is a worry at all, would appear to apply with equal force to tense 
realism. Here’s a book about tense realism, written in 1975 by Timmy the Tense Realist. 
Timmy believes that events of 1975 are intrinsically distinguished. Does he really expect 
me to believe the same? Am I to put his book down, go off to my class and announce: 
“Timmy the Tense Realist has convinced me that the events of 1975 are special, that 
those events alone have the intrinsic property being-now.” Surely not. And if this writer 
doesn’t expect me to believe what he believes, then why should I take him seriously?  
 Second pass: Perspectival realism is absurd in a way that tense realism is not. If I 
adopt tense realism then there is a way in which I can embrace all of Timmy the Tense 
Realist’s beliefs and he can embrace all of mine. I can insist that Timmy was right to 
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believe and assert that the events of 1975 had the intrinsic property being-now, because it 
was the case, back then, that the events of 1975 had the intrinsic property being-now. 
Timmy can insist that I will be right to believe and assert that the events of 2009 have the 
intrinsic property being-now, because it will be the case that the events of 2009 have the 
intrinsic property being-now. Timmy and I can agree that when we are assessing what 
past and future people should believe and assert, the question is not whether the world is 
the way that they believed and asserted (will believe and assert) it to be, but rather 
whether the world was the way that they believed and asserted (will believe and assert) it 
to be. But there seems to be no analogous way for me to adopt perspectival realism and 
embrace all that Penny the Perspectival Realist believes. When we are assessing what 
other people should believe, the question is not whether the world is the way they believe 
it to be, but rather whether the world… what? There seems to be nothing for the 
perspectival realist that can play the role that how things were or will be plays for the 
tense realist. So the perspectival realist, unlike the tense realist, must think that all other 
people, including other perspectival realists, are fundamentally mistaken about the 
distribution of interesting intrinsic properties.    
 Let’s go over this worry more carefully. As a tense realist, I embrace what Timmy 
the Tense Realist believed and asserted by making two moves. First, I add a further layer 
of facts to the simple tense realist picture. I say that, in addition to facts about what 
properties things have, there are facts about what properties things had. The events of 
1975 have the intrinsic property being-past, had the intrinsic property being-now.5 
                                                 
5 What does the tense realist mean by saying that ‘events of 1975 had the intrinsic property being-now’? 
Maybe she takes this to be primitive fact, inexplicable in more basic terms, or maybe she doesn’t. Maybe, 
for example, she says that there is a second temporal dimension – hyper-time. Events may exist at different 
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Second, I say that these extra facts have a peculiar bearing on the correctness of belief 
and assertion. We should not think of, e.g., Timmy’s beliefs and assertions as mistaken, 
because things were just as Timmy believed and asserted them to be. 
 Of course, it is not enough for me just to say this. I will need to spell out the general 
view of the correctness of belief and assertion in detail. And I will need to explain how 
the correctness of beliefs and assertions relates to their contents – where the content of an 
assertion / belief is what is asserted / believed. 
  There are various ways of doing it. Here’s one. I say that beliefs and assertions are 
correct if and only their contents are true, incorrect if and only if their contents are false. 
But I say that beliefs and assertions have content only if they have the property being-
now. So, e.g., Timmy’s 1975 brain states (which exist, I remind you) are not beliefs with 
content, and the events of Timmy moving his mouth and tapping away at his typewriter 
(which exist, I remind you) are not assertions with content. So it is no good asking “Is 
Timmy right? Are his beliefs and assertions correct or incorrect?” They are neither. If we 
are interested in assessing Timmy we must instead ask “Was Timmy right, thirty five 
years ago? Were his beliefs and assertions correct or incorrect, thirty five years ago?” 
And the answer is yes. Thirty five years ago, Timmy’s beliefs and assertions had the 
property being-now, so they had content. And thirty five years ago the content (that 
events of 1975 have the property being-now) was true. So, thirty five years ago, Timmy’s 
beliefs and assertions were correct. 
                                                 
moments in hyper-time. Events may have different properties at different moments in hyper-time. She 
means that, at some hyper-moment in the hyper-past, events of 1975 have the intrinsic property being-now.   
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 Here’s another way of doing it. I say that beliefs and assertions are correct if and 
only if their contents are true, incorrect if and only if their contents are false. I concede 
that Timmy’s 1975 beliefs and assertions have content. But I say that their content has 
changed over time. Thirty five years ago, their content was that events of 1975 have the 
property being-now. Their content is that, thirty five years ago, events of 1975 had the 
property being-now. Thirty five years ago, their content was true, so thirty five years ago, 
they were correct. Their content is true, so they are correct. 
 Here’s yet another way of doing it. I deny that beliefs and assertions are correct if 
and only their contents are true, incorrect if and only if their contents are false. I say that 
past and future beliefs and assertions are correct if and only their contents were (will be) 
true when they had (will have) the property being-now. So, e.g., Timmy’s 1975 beliefs 
and assertions have false content, but they are correct because, back when they had the 
property being-now, their contents were true. When I look back at what Timmy believed 
and said, I should think: “False – but rightly so.” 
 Whichever way I choose to go, I can embrace all that Timmy believes. Can I 
embrace all that Penny the Perspectival Realist believes by making similar moves? The 
worry is that I can’t. 
 But I can. My first move is to add another layer of facts to the simple perspectival 
realist picture. I say that, in addition to facts about how things are, there are facts about 
how, from other people’s points of view, things are. So the Dibaba-American rival pair 
has the property of having its faster half to the left. (Note that this remains an intrinsic 
property of the pair. It does not have this property in virtue of standing in any relation to 
anything else. In particular, it does not have this property in virtue of standing in any 
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relation to me.) But from your point of view the Dibaba-American rival pair has the 
property of having its faster half to the right. (Again, the property is intrinsic. From your 
point of view it does not have this property in virtue of standing in any relation to 
anything else. In particular, it does not have this property in virtue of standing in any 
relation to you). My second move is to say that these extra facts have the familiar bearing 
on the correctness of belief and assertion. I should not think of, e.g., Penny’s beliefs and 
assertions as mistaken, because from Penny’s point of view things are just as Penny 
believes and asserts them to be. 
 Again, I will need to explain how, in general, the correctness of beliefs and 
assertions relates to their contents. And there are different ways to do it. I could say that 
beliefs and assertions are correct if and only if their contents are true, but deny that 
Penny’s beliefs and assertions have content – it’s rather that from Penny’s point of view 
Penny’s beliefs and assertions have content. So there’s no point my asking “is Penny 
correct or incorrect?” She is neither. The relevant question is “from Penny’s point of 
view, is she correct?” And the answer is yes. 
 Or I could say that beliefs and assertions are correct if and only if their contents are 
true, but say that from different points of view, their contents are different. The content of 
(e.g.) Penny’s assertions is that from Penny’s point of view Dibaba is to the right. From 
Penny’s point of view the content of Penny’s beliefs and assertions is that Dibaba is to 
the right. So Penny is correct, and from her point of view she is correct. 
 Or I could deny that beliefs and assertions are correct if and only if their contents are 
true. I could say they are correct if and only if from the point of view of the believer / 
asserter their content is true. So the contents of Penny’s beliefs and assertions (e.g. that 
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Dibaba is to the right) are false, but the beliefs and assertions are correct, because from 
her point of view their contents are true. Confronted with Penny’s beliefs and assertions, I 
should think “False – but rightly so.”6 
 But, whichever way I flesh out my view of the correctness of belief and assertion, 
have I not incurred a cost? My first move was to add some facts to my simple 
perspectival realist picture: facts about how, from other people’s points of view, things 
are. Isn’t that a major departure from the central perspectival realist idea?  
 I don’t think so. I find myself surrounded by other people, outwardly very like me, 
and I must in some way acknowledge the reality of their alternative points of view. I 
cannot, on pain of abandoning my perspectival realism, do it by saying that all 
perspectival properties are relational – e.g. Dibaba is to the right in relation to my point of 
view, to the left in relation to other people’s points of view. I must insist that Dibaba is 
just to the right. So I admit some extra facts. Dibaba is just to the right, but from other 




 Perspectival realism shares many of the virtues and lacks many of the vices of tense 
realism. The central tense realist idea is to take appearances seriously, to take it that the 
world has certain perspectival features that we represent it to have in experience. If you 
find yourself sympathetic to this idea then I recommend that you consider going the 
whole hog, and becoming a perspectival realist. 
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